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Abstract 
Modern control systems are becoming in-
creasingly complex. If failure mechanisms and 
effect are known, it is often sinple to make sr.a] 
design changes, which lead to fail safe design. 
The problem is to discover the large number of 
different failure possibilities. 
The cause/consequence diagram provides a 
good way of describing the sequential effects 
in a failure, important i:i central systers. Pro-
duction of cause/conneqner.'."- i a-rams Is at 
p**es"nt a .'skilled manual ta:;«-. 
A : -tinj;! is presented for rrnduoinr cause/ 
cor.jequcnce d 1 agr-ams automatically, starting 
with a block diar.rar. of the system to be analyser 
and equations describing the operation of each 
component, under normal and failure conditions. 
Theorem proving technique:; are used to deduce 
the sequence of events occurrinr; after a failure, 
The method makes; it possible to define what 
1-s meant by a "complete" failure analysis, in 
practice, it seems that such "complete" analyses 
require a large amount of computer tire. Human 
interaction helps in avoiding unnecessarily do-
Copies to 
. led analy; 
of the ana lyses 
and in i n c r e a s i n g e f f i c i enc . 
Available on request from the Library of the Danish 
Atomic Energy Commission (Atomenergikommissionens 
Bibliotek), Rise, DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark 
Telephone: (03) 35 5! 01, ext. 334. telex: 41116 
A semiautomatic method for qualitative failure mode d.".aly:;is 
failure r.ode and effects analysis, and fault tree analy.si:., 
are two established techniques for studyinp the reliab'.litv of 
large systems. The method to be described here is a formalized 
version of "cause-consequence analysis" which ir. a diagrammatic 
technique for presenting the sequence of events leadinp f> a 
failure, and the conditions under which these events can take 
place (D.S. Nielsen 1971). 
The reasons for formalizing failure analysis, are tae dif-
ficulty and cost of analysing the reliability of large systems, 
with many, unlikely, failure modes. The needs for more automatic 
methods of qualitative failure analysis have been studied ir. deptn 
by Powers (1973) and methods for building fault trees automatically 
have been described by Fussel (1973). The methods described here 
are directed especially to those cases where sequence is important, 
particularly sequential controllers, computer control, ard t'r.e 
checking of written operating procedures. 
Cause consequence analysis 
Cause consequence diagrams present events in a flow chart 
form. Alternative event sequences may depend on conditions within 
a system, and decision boxes describe this dependency. Broken lines 
are used to represent conditions, and conditions are combined using 
and/or gates. A cause consequence diagram can be regarded as a com-
bination of fault trees and flow charts. (See example, Figure 1). 
Cause consequence diagrams have certain advantage when compared 
with fault trees. They give a more concise expression of the sequen-
tial dependence of events, than do fault trees, and do not need to 
make use of time labelling conventions. This is an advantage when 
sequential control, operator procedures, or computer operation is 
to be described. (However, a cause consequence diagram car; be trans-
lated to a fault tree, by using time labelling convention;;). 
As will be seen, the cause consequence diagram of a failure is 
also more directly related to the physical structure of the system 
which is to be analysed, than the corresponding fault tree, and its 
construction requires smaller steps in reasoning. 
Systematic development of cause/conbe<;uence diag_ram^ 
The starting point for a systematic development of a cause/ 
consequence diagram, is a block diagram showing th«- physical struc-
ture of a plant. Eacn block represents a piece of equipment. cac!\ 
line represents an interconnection or relation between pieces of 
equipment, or plant component;. 
fiach bloc'- requiies a mathematical deuci \ pt»••<.. of .vow . t wr^ri,, 
in i nput/outp'jt terms. These descriptions c-in \ <•• river. : •• .•< •• -r 
equations, transfer functions, or logical statements. 
Each line on the diagram represents a variablt - *or -xd.^i-
a voltape, and the hlocVs are regarded as ncievinp inr-ut var: 
ables and producing the values of output variables. Arrows a^  e 
drawn on the diagrair., representinp the direction of cause arv:! 
effect (Taylor 1° 73). For example the coil current of a rels-
may be reparded as an input variable, and the contact stat- •-* 
the relay as an output variable. 
A "condition description" is a lopical statement which .in-
scribes the values of (sone) system variables over a r^r'ci -*~ 
time. An "event" is = lorical statement v.'hich descries aV;;-.:ir-
conditions. 
Given a condition at the input to a component, ar.d a math-
ematical description cr the component, an outcut ocnc.cicn c»r "• r 
deduced. 
Example: 
A relay can he described by -
if power at input, then power at output 
INPUT 
OUTPUT 
an input condition: 
yields an output condition: 
pover at input 
power at output 
Similarly, if an input event description is given, an outfu1 
event description can In? deduced For describing events, . t i 
convenient to u:;e the condition description which, becomes true 
after the
 f.-vent has occured. It is also useful to associate w-;tll 
the event description, a 
occurred. 
record of the time at which *'• 
lip,. c. and 6 shows or.»: way of r«.';,rf!'.*nt i np 
deducing events within a svstem. If there are r. 
flowing from A romncr. on t . Th,*»r. th-Tf ma" vd 1 •• 
chains also flowinp from thf 
to a component, then the cor: 
put, will depend on th< .o'.'i 
inputs. This rives r;se to '. 
sequence diagram. 
:'Tf U S ' : 
'•".-rr.por.r'T.t. 
• » ' i u e r , >_-s of 
t i o r . s -. : -';. 
a;, 
», - , » • : on 
f
. w f r a . outpu* 
he •,•> v 'ri ] pvi'i 
••re rxr>• y:v<![ a . 
h s u t <-vent T . o; 
_ 1 _ 
r->me con;:..r.er,r; have "irenory", and as a resuit, r.ay : r-
output ever.ts ai o^r.e time after an input event. Ir. some ca: 
several delayed event chains v/i 11 be produced. An exanple i: 
case of a tir.-.r relav. •"cmronents with memcr, ir.tr--ducr del; 
the cause consequence diacram, and also the poss:hilit\- ccr 
conflict between event chairs. 
Automation of diagram construction 
The process of leducinp output events , piver. ar. ir.-_* ••:•-::* 
can be automated, usfnr techniques developed for autc.r.atic v.ecr 
proving (see e.?. Niilson 1971). What is more, provided tr.at -r.f-
component and input -;ver.t descriptions are r.ot ter o-'-pl; r -i • •• - , 
deduction process i-. "coKriete". TT.is means that a standard, or 
"canonical1' form :J chosen for event description;;. T:.^r. r:v«:. -.n 
input ev**r,t, a car.or. ;cal f~rm description cf all the. jc'-s i."'. - -u 
put events is produced, and the conditions under wh:cr, these c\:t 
put events can occur. 
What remains, is to automate the process Ly whicr. the tff-c 
of a sinple ''spontaneous" or "initial" event leads tr- fellow in,; 
chains of events. The rules for tracing event chains are riv^r. i 
table 1. 
Each time a component is reached which has several inputs, 
the ensuine chains cf events will depend on the conditions it 
these inputs. This means that it is also necessary to trace hack 
ward through *he block diagram, building up a "tree" of conditi 
to check if the necc?sarv input conditions can be fulfilled. Thi 
process is described in table 2. 
An example 
Ar. example was riven Ly Haas! of a chemical dosing 
system, and safety system. Ti:is example was used bv Fu.:;-e. -
demonstrate a technique for building fault tre»*c automat. c i i 
(Tussel 1973). The example is _sed here to demonstrate the ri-
st ruction of cause consequence diagrams. 
The svstem consists of a pum'j and rest: voir, When a ;.\;t 
is pr-.-ssed the pump operates filling the res°rvoir wit:, gr 
to a certain pressure. When that pressure is reached, *.*.*> x>-
quired amount of gas it; ready for d-'ii/ery. f f.rrer :e'.-r; 
tc switch off the pump, ir the case of failure with . r. t;.- r-
mainder of the control system. 
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relay coil 
if (nc failure) ther. if (power at input 1 and sin? -at inrut i ) 
then (contact clewed) 
else if (coil failed) then (contact open) 
contact 
if (no failure) then if (contact closed and power at ccr.tar-t ;'-•,; 
then (power at contact output and sink, at v:.tac-
input) 
else if (con'act failed closed) then (contact closed) 
pressure switch 
if (no failure) then if (pressure > switchinp pressure) 
then (contact open) else (contact closed) 
else if (pressure switch failed or pressure line plugped) 
then (contact closed) 
A cause-ccnsequence diagram for the example was developed bv 
hand, following the rules given in tables 1 and 2, and it shows 
in Fig. 8 to 10. 
Significanse for failure analysis 
In order to make a complete cause consequence analysis in 
the way described here, the event chains leading from Loth "nor-
mal operation" events and failure events must be traced, Thir. 
results in diagrams with a very large amount of information. Zr 
be useful, the cause-consequence diagrams must be edited. Event-, 
occurring during normal operation may be eliminated, and se-
quences of directly connected events condensed to a single even*. 
If sequence is not significant, the cause consequence diaprd" 
cen be condensed to a failure tree, as in Fip. 11. 
Automation of some of the steps in constructing cau ,e .re-
sequence diagrams has bepun. It ir, felt that interactive ar.ulvc. 
is better than complete automation, with an •jnpineer controlling 
the development of the diagrams. In this wav, it :v posiiM«- '.'->: 
the significance of the diaprams to Le presented more clear";-.", -• r.J 
the engineer is more involved with the worVinp of tlie svste.-. 'r 
also means that any deficiercies in plant model, are r,'z>- "! • .• 
to be recognized. 
- 5 -
The fact that the procedure described here is, in a sense 
"complete", is an advantage. At the moment engineers must check 
designs, both for "wear out" and design errors, on the basis of 
their experience and intuition. They carry a large responsibility, 
and their studies must be thorough and detailed. The technique 
described here depends on the degree of detail in individual 
component models. If the models are adequate to describe fonr.s 
of component failure observed in the past, then the consequences 
of those component failures repeating themselves, within a dif-
ferent system, can be predicted completely. 
- 6 -
Table 1 
Method for obtaining basic cause consequense diagram. 
1) Start with initial set of independent events and initial 
conditions. 
2) Select an initial event (failure or normal operation) ar.d 
3) deduce the output event(s) for the related component. 
••' Check the input conditions for the component, to discover 
which of the output events are feasible (see table 2). 
5) If there are any conditions which conflict with conditions 
earlier in the event chain, or with the initial conditio.".:,, 
delete the related output event. 
6) Add the new events, and the related condition trees to the 
diagram. Record the new conditions established for- the 
component. 
7) Select the earliest (in time) of the output events for the 
component, and trace the block diagram, so that the output 
events become input events to the next component. Repeat 
the procedure from step 3. 
8) If there are no output events for a component, back track 
in the block diagram, to the first "undeveloped" output 
event, and develop that. 
"0 Iterate, to ensure that ail possible sys ter. state;; *re 
treated. 
Table 2 
Method for checking prior conditions for an event. 
1) Begin with an output event for a particular component -
tne "main" component. 
2) Deduce the input conditions å r the component, which will 
allow the event to occur. 
3) Trace one of the input lines to the component backwards, tr 
the previous component in the block diagram, to determine 
whether the associated condition is feasible. 
t) Deduce whether the output condition of the new component 
is feasible. The condition may be feasible because 
a) an earlier event established the conditiont in 
which case this dependency shc:ld be recorded on 
the cause consequence diagram, 
b) the condition is an initial condition for the system. 
5) If the condition is feasible, combine it in "and" form with 
conditions associated with other input lines to tho main 
component. If the condition is not feasible, record it as 
"false". 
6) Repeat from step 3, but using another input line for the 
main component. 
7) When all the input lines for the main component ha\'e been 
checked, simplify the associated condition tree. If it 
*• ^  fnn ~\ ~ £ •* n*? ^/-* ^ ^ 1 *- r* ^Vv«»% i *"» r» « ^» *-» + V> *•» **** + v*t •+- #**»«»-*••-
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Table 3 
Method for editing cause/consequence diagram to give a fault tree. 
1) Delete all events which depend on normal input conditions, 
and normal operation events alone. 
2) If there is a series of "event boxes" in the diagram with 
no delay or decision boxes intervening, shrink the series 
to a single event. 
3) Replace decision boxes by two "and" gates, as in figure 2. 
•O Replace "decision to event" boxes by a single line, but 
record on subsequent "and" gates the relative timings of 
events as in figure 2. 
5) Indicate times on all initial events and conditions. Trace 
through the fault tree recording the times on each event 
box, and updating the time value, whenever a delay box is 
reached. Delete the delay boxes. 
- 9 -
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